Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/85033
Authors: 
Güth, Werner
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2013-013
Abstract: 
A group of actors, individuals or firms, can engage in collectively providing projects which may be costly or generating revenues and which may benefit some and harm others. Based on requirements of procedural fairness (Güth and Kliemt, 2013), we derive a bidding mechanism determining endogenously who participates in collective provision, which projects are implemented, and the positive or negative payments due to the participating members. We justify and discuss this procedural fairness approach and compare it with that of optimal, e.g. welfaristic game theoretic mechanism design (e.g. Myerson, 1979).
Subjects: 
Collective action
equality axiom
mechanism design
procedural fairness
public provision
JEL: 
D44
D46
D61
D62
D63
D71
D72
D73
D74
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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