Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/84983
Authors: 
Hermstrüwer, Yoan
Dickert, Stephan
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2013/15
Abstract: 
Privacy law relies on the argument that consent does not entail any relevant impediments for the liberty of the consenting individual. Challenging this argument, we experimentally investigate whether consent to the publication of personal information in cyberspace entails self-coercion on a social norm level. Our results suggest that the monetary benefits from consent constitute a price that people are willing to accept for increased compliance with social norms. Providing people with a prior consent option is sufficient to generate chilling effects (i.e., a reduction of norm-deviant behavior). However, nudging people towards potential publicity does not increase the value they place on privacy. We also test how the default design of the right to deletion of personal information (right to be forgotten) affects chilling effects and privacy valuations. Surprisingly, the right to be forgotten does not reduce chilling effects. Moreover, individuals tend to stick with the status quo of permanent information storage.
Subjects: 
Social Norms
Nudges
Behavioral Law and Economics of Privacy
Consent
Right to Be Forgotten
Dictator Games
JEL: 
C93
C91
A13
D03
K29
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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