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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods No. 2013/18
Verlag: 
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper studies a firm´s optimal capital structure in an environment, where the firm´s stock price serves as a public signal for its credit worthiness. In equilibrium, equity investors choose how much information to acquire privately, which induces a positive relation between the amount of equity issued and the stock price signal´s precision. Thus, through its capital structure, the firm can internalize the informational externality that stock prices exert on bond yields. Firms with a strong fundamental therefore issue more equity and less debt than they would if the informational spill-over did not exist.
Schlagwörter: 
information aggregation
capital structure
sequential markets
market depth
JEL: 
G32
D83
C73
G10
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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