The prevention of nuclear proliferation has become a high priority for the international community. The paper analyses the rationale for - and against - this high priority, viewing it as a means to the end of preventing nuclear war rather than as an end in itself. It then proceeds to analyse the proliferation risks in Africa, finding them to be quite insignificant. The former (unofficial) nuclear weapons state South Africa has destroyed its nuclear weapons and joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and Libya has apparently abandoned its former nuclear ambitions, whereas other potential nuclear proliferants such as Egypt were never very serious in their quest for nuclear weapons. Africa is thus mainly of interest in a non-proliferation context by virtue of its uranian deposits. While the most important producers are today under satisfactory control, it is conceivable--but not very likely--that uranium mining will become economically feasible in other countries in the future, depending mainly on the price of uranium ore. Due to the generally low technological level and the almost complete absence of processing facilities, it is deemed highly unlikely that any new nuclear powers will emerge in Africa.