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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Serie Documentos de Trabajo No. 283
Verlag: 
Universidad del Centro de Estudios Macroeconómicos de Argentina (UCEMA), Buenos Aires
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper seeks to expand on two topical strands in Government Finance and Political Science literature, rent-seeking and the soft-budget constraint, so as to bring forth a strong linkage with corporate governance environments. It will attempt to accomplish this task by setting up a distinctive framework of analysis that hinges on incremental cash flows. Firstly, it claims that both rent-seeking behavior and the soft-budget constraint are worthy of being applied to corporate governance learning and practice. Secondly, the paper contributes to focus on cash-flows reliability and managers' accountability. Thirdly, it is shown how conflicts of interest underlie rent-seeking behavior, and how the latter relates to the soft-budget constraint.
Schlagwörter: 
Rent-Seeking
Soft-Budget Constraint
Corporate Governance
Incremental Cash Flow model
Conflicts of Interest
JEL: 
G30
G34
D72
D74
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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