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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Serie Documentos de Trabajo No. 288
Verlag: 
Universidad del Centro de Estudios Macroeconómicos de Argentina (UCEMA), Buenos Aires
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper we set forth a new perspective from which to understand and measure the brokerage of asymmetric information that intermediaries usually carry out. Firstly, we deal with partitions of a given set so as to lay grounds to our line of research. Secondly, we argue that trade splits up imperfect information sets, over which traders try to negotiate and profit, but also hide their opportunistic behavior from their counterparts. Next, the brokerage of asymmetric information is framed so as to stress the fact that any exchange is dual, entailing not only bargaining property rights but also information value. Lastly, we bring to light the linkage between differential rates, residual information sets and trading environments, which seems to be a functional toolkit for assessing how much asymmetric information is brokered eventually.
Schlagwörter: 
asymmetric information
brokerage
differential rates
residual information sets
financial intermediaries
JEL: 
G14
D82
D80
C78
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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