Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/84255
Authors: 
Apreda, Rodolfo
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Serie Documentos de Trabajo, Universidad del CEMA: Área: finanzas 319
Abstract: 
State-owned enterprises set a clear example of a mixed governance, in which the public and private realms blend together to bring about a complex structure we are going to define as dual governance. This paper puts forth a new design of governance for state-owned banks. Firstly, the whole subject is framed within the transaction costs approach to financial intermediation. Next, we move on to the formal governance of state-owned banks. Afterwards, we focus on dual governance and expand on agency problems that arise from the fiduciary role, accountability, transparency, rent-seeking and soft-budget constraints. The paper's proposal hinges upon the subsidiarity portfolio, to which the state-owned bank should manage as a trustee only, so that dual governance could be enhanced. We conclude bringing forth a minimal set of dual governance principles.
Subjects: 
governance
public governance
dual governance
state-owned banks
subsidiarity
JEL: 
G34
G21
D23
D73
H20
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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