Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/84220 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Serie Documentos de Trabajo No. 481
Verlag: 
Universidad del Centro de Estudios Macroeconómicos de Argentina (UCEMA), Buenos Aires
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper argues that special purpose vehicles, SPVs, are two-edged financial constructs whose bad edge consists in conveying opaque governance, whereas its good one amounts to interesting financial engineering. Firstly, the notion of opaque governance is highlighted, to focus next on SPVs and their governance. Afterwards, the paper delves into collateralized debt obligations and their facilitators, the offshore locations. Last, the failing role of some regulators and gatekeepers is emphasized with the purpose of setting up new measures to prevent them from claiming the Preacher's waiver.
Schlagwörter: 
opaque governance
special purpose vehicles
collateralized debt obligations
offshore locations
gatekeepers
regulators
JEL: 
G34
G15
G21
G24
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
125.64 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.