Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/84185
Autoren: 
Potrafke, Niklas
Datum: 
2013
Reihe/Nr.: 
ifo Working Paper 164
Zusammenfassung: 
Principal-agent problems can arise when preferences of voters are not aligned with preferences of political representatives. Often the consequence of the political principalagentproblem is political catering to special interests. In this paper I provide examples of principal-agent problems regarding public spending. The examples concern construction or extension of concert halls in two German cities. Resistance to public funding for the concert halls was particularly strong in electoral districts with large constituencieson the left. The evidence indicates that political representatives were more bourgeois than their constituencies. In the cases studied asymmetric information did not prevailand voters were able to discipline their representatives through referenda that countered the results of voting by political representatives.
Schlagwörter: 
Principal-agent problem
referendum
direct democracy
political representation
political ideology
cultural policy
JEL: 
D72
D78
H72
Z10
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.