Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/84173
Authors: 
Auerswald, Heike
Schmidt, Carsten
Thum, Marcel
Torsvik, Gaute
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 4406
Abstract: 
Many decisions in politics and business are made by teams rather than by single individuals. In contrast, economic models typically assume an individual rational decision maker. A rapidly growing body of (experimental) literature investigates team decisions in different settings. We study team decisions in a public goods contribution game with a costly punishment option and compare it to the behavior of individuals in a laboratory experiment. We also consider different team decision-making rules (unanimity, majority). We find that teams contribute significantly more and punish less than individuals, regardless of the team decision rule. Overall, teams yield higher payoffs than individuals.
Subjects: 
group decision making
public good
experiment
punishment
JEL: 
H54
Q54
Q58
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.