Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/83973
Authors: 
Azacis, Helmuts
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2005/10
Abstract: 
I consider the problem of assigning agents to indivisible objects, in which each agent pays a price for his object and all prices sum to a given constant. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the agents' true preferences. I propose a simple mechanism whereby agents announce valuations for all objects and an envy-free allocation is selected with respect to these announced preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism implements both in Nash and strong Nash equilibrium the set of true envy-free allocations.
Subjects: 
Indivisible Goods
Envy-Freeness
Implementation
Strong Nash Equilibrium
JEL: 
C78
C71
D78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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