Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/83916
Authors: 
Āzacis, Helmuts
Collie, David R.
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2007/27
Abstract: 
The result of Colombo and Labrecciosa [Colombo, Luca and Labrecciosa, Paola (2006). 'The suboptimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames', Economics Letters 90, pp. 116-121.] that optimal punishments are inferior to Nash-reversion trigger strategies with decreasing marginal costs is shown to be due to the output when a firm deviates from the punishment path becoming negative.
Subjects: 
Optimal punishments
Trigger strategies
Collusion
Cartels
JEL: 
C73
D43
L13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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