Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/83911
Authors: 
Clarke, Roger
Collie, David R.
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2006/15
Abstract: 
This article analyses export taxes in a Bertrand duopoly with product differentiation, where a home and a foreign firm both export to a third-country market. It is shown that the maximum-revenue export tax always exceeds the optimum-welfare export tax. In a Nash equilibrium in export taxes, the country with the low cost firm imposes the largest export tax. The results under Bertrand duopoly are compared with those under Cournot duopoly. It is shown that the absolute value of the export subsidy or tax under Cournot duopoly exceeds the export tax under Bertrand duopoly.
Subjects: 
Trade Policy
Imperfect Competition
Oligopoly
JEL: 
F12
F13
L13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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