Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/83495 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Kiel Working Paper No. 1870
Verlag: 
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), Kiel
Zusammenfassung: 
Political proximity between donor and recipient governments may impair the effectiveness of aid by encouraging favoritism. By contrast, political misalignment between donor and recipient governments may render aid less effective by adding to transaction costs and giving rise to incentive problems. We test these competing hypotheses empirically by considering the political ideology of both governments along the left-right spectrum in augmented models on the economic growth effects of aid. Following the estimation approach of Clemens et al. (2012), we find that aid tends to be less effective when political ideology differs between the donor and the recipient.
Schlagwörter: 
aid effectiveness
economic growth
politics and aid
government ideology
JEL: 
O19
O11
F35
F53
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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