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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IES Working Paper No. 12/2008
Verlag: 
Charles University in Prague, Institute of Economic Studies (IES), Prague
Zusammenfassung: 
Credit contracting between a lender with a market power and a small start-up entrepreneur may lead to a rejection of projects whose expected benefits are higher than their total costs when an adverse selection is present. This inefficiency may be eliminated by a government support in the form of credit guarantees or subsidies. The principal-agent model of this paper compares different forms of government support and concludes that a guarantee defined as a proportion of a gross interest rate is not a sufficiently robust policy instrument. Lump-sum guarantees and interest rate subsidies are evaluated as better instruments because they have a nonambiguous positive effect on a social efficiency since they enable funding of socially efficient projects which would not be financed otherwise.
Schlagwörter: 
information asymmetry
credit
guarantees
subsidies
JEL: 
D82
G18
H25
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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