Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/83360
Authors: 
Derviz, Alexis
Seidler, Jakub
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
IES Working Paper 21/2012
Abstract: 
We discuss (dis)incentives for fair cooperation related to delegating macroprudential policy decisions to a supranational body, as well as their welfare implications. The question is studied by means of a signaling game of imperfect information between two national regulators. The model concentrates on informational frictions in an environment with otherwise fully aligned preferences. We show that even in the absence of evident conflicting goals, the non-transferrable nature of some regulatory information creates misreporting incentives. However, the major problem is not the reporting accuracy but the institutional arrangement focused on maximal multilateral satisfaction to the detriment of credible enforcement of rules. The main application is meant to be systemic risk management by the relevant EU institutions.
Subjects: 
macroprudential regulation
integration
autonomy
information
reporting
JEL: 
F55
H77
D02
C72
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper
Appears in Collections:

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.