Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/83299
Authors: 
Gregor, Martin
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
IES Working Paper 32/2011
Abstract: 
This survey covers recent literature on lobbying, with particular focus on corporate lobbying. Three main research traditions – contests for policy rent, persuasion games, and multiple means models - are analyzed in detail. Various strategic aspects of lobbying are presented in the context of a single unified model that encompasses both strategic communication and monetary contributions. Next, the review investigates into three particular issues in the lobbying literature: (i) Incentive to lobby and the equilibrium amount of lobbying, both in the presence and absence of competitors, (ii) strategic substitution and complementarity of lobbying and contributions, and (iii) the role of intermediation in lobbying. Recent evidence from corporate lobbying is presented.
Subjects: 
lobbying
political contributions
menu auction
contest
persuasion
JEL: 
D72
D82
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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