Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/83130
Authors: 
Björnerstedt, Jonas
Westermark, Andreas
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Department of Economics, Uppsala University 2006:29
Abstract: 
This paper studies infinite-horizon bargaining between a seller and multiple buyers when externalities are present. We extend the analysis in Jehiel & Moldovanu (1995a) by allowing for both pure and mixed equilibria. A characterization of the stationary subgame perfect equilibria in generic games is presented. Equilibria with delay exist only for strong positive externalities. Since each buyer receives a positive payoff when the seller makes an agreement with some other buyer, positive externalities induce a war of attrition between buyers.
Subjects: 
ANC
Bargaining
externalities
delay
JEL: 
C72
C78
D62
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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