Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/83086
Authors: 
Kronbak, Lone Grønbæk
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Department of Environmental and Business Economics, University of Southern Denmark 55
Abstract: 
The paper sets up a discrete-time, deterministic, coalition game model among the major agents exploiting the cod stock in Baltic Sea. The characteristic func-tion is constructed and the Shapley value and the nucleolus are used as one-point solution concepts. The paper identifies the problem with these sharing rules and develops a new sharing rule which takes into account the stability of cooperation. The paper contributes to the literature by introducing a connection between cooperative games (sharing rules) and non-cooperative games (stabil-ity).
Subjects: 
Fisheries
Cooperation
Coalition Game
Baltic Sea Cod
Shapley value
Characteristic function
nucleolus
Sharing rules
stability of cooperation
JEL: 
Q22
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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