Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/83078
Authors: 
Jensen, Frank
Vestergaard, Niels
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Department of Environmental and Business Economics, University of Southern Denmark 54
Abstract: 
Within fisheries it is well-known that several market failures exist. However, fisheries economists analyse these market failures separately despite the fact that the market failures arise simultaneously. In this paper several market fail-ures that arise simultaneously are analysed. A resource stock tax and a tax on self-reported harvest are considered as a solution to problems associated with the stock externality, measuring individual catches and stock uncertainty. Within a fisheries economic model it is shown that it will be in the interest of risk-averse fishermen to report a part of their catch even without a control pol-icy. In addition, it is shown that this tax structure can secure optimal expected individual catches and simulations show that the tax payment is very low. Thus, the tax system may be useful in practical fisheries management.
Subjects: 
Prices regulation
Quantity regulation
Asymmetric Information
Self-Reporting
Stock Tax and Harvest Tax
JEL: 
Q22
K4
L51
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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