Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/83030 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1998
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper Series No. 59
Verlag: 
Sveriges Riksbank, Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
The recent debate over monetary policy strategies concludes that monetary targeting and inflation targeting in practice lead to very similar patterns of central bank behavior. This raises the question why central banks insist on the strategies they use. In this paper, we develop an answer from political economy. After showing that closed-loop monetary strategies using similar information sets imply similar monetary policy performance, we argue that monetary strategies are helpful in solving internal and external coordination problems for the central bank. We illustrate the point by reviewing the Bundesbank's introduction of monetary targeting in the mid- 1970s. Monetary targeting was important for the Bank as a signal that the previous monetary regime had been overcome, as a means to define the role of monetary policy vis-a-vis other players in the macro economic policy game, and to structure the internal monetary policy debate. The last section discusses the implications of this view for the new European Central Bank.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
130.28 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.