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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2001
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 1998:13
Verlag: 
Uppsala University, Department of Economics, Uppsala
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper analyses Becker´s (1971) theory of employer discrimination within a search and wage-bargaining setting. Discriminatory firms pay workers who are discriminated against less, and apply stricter hiring-criteria to these workers. It is shown that the highest profits are realized by firms with a positive discrimination coefficient. Moreover, once ownership and control are separated, both highest profits and highest utility may be realized by firms with a positive discrimination coefficient. Thus, market forces, like entry and/or takeovers do not ensure that wage differentials due to employer discrimination will disappear.
Schlagwörter: 
Search
discrimination
JEL: 
J71
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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