Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/82895
Authors: 
Rosén, Åsa
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Department of Economics, Uppsala University 1998:13
Abstract: 
This paper analyses Becker´s (1971) theory of employer discrimination within a search and wage-bargaining setting. Discriminatory firms pay workers who are discriminated against less, and apply stricter hiring-criteria to these workers. It is shown that the highest profits are realized by firms with a positive discrimination coefficient. Moreover, once ownership and control are separated, both highest profits and highest utility may be realized by firms with a positive discrimination coefficient. Thus, market forces, like entry and/or takeovers do not ensure that wage differentials due to employer discrimination will disappear.
Subjects: 
Search
discrimination
JEL: 
J71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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