Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/82876
Authors: 
Kolm, Ann-Sofie
Larsen, Birthe
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Department of Economics, Uppsala University 2001:9
Abstract: 
While examining the macroeconomic effects of increased government control of the informal sector, this paper develops a two-sector general equilibrium model featuring matching frictions, and heterogeneous workers in terms of moral. This facilitates an analysis of how wage setting and unemployment is affected by punishment policies, which is ignored in the previous literature.
Subjects: 
Tax evasion
wage bargains
matching
moral
unemployment
JEL: 
H26
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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