Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/82861
Authors: 
Voorneveld, Mark
Grahn, Sofia
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Department of Economics, Uppsala University 2001:2
Abstract: 
A set of necessary and sufficient conditions for convexity of a transferable utility game in terms of its decomposition into unanimity games is shown to be minimal: none of the conditions is redundant. The result is used to provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value on the set of convex games.
Subjects: 
Convex game
unanimity game
Shapley value
axiomatization
JEL: 
C71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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