Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/82854
Authors: 
Dufwenberg, Martin
Year of Publication: 
1996
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Department of Economics, Uppsala University 1997:1
Abstract: 
A simple model of marriage and divorce predicts that no marriages occur. Yet, in real life, people marry all the time in seemingly similar situations. This discordance is explained using psychological game theory. An emotional guilt effect is explicitly modeled and multiple belief-dependent equilibria become possible: some marriages don’t happen, some are formed but end in divorce, some last a lifetime. For certain parameterizations a lifelong efficient marriage is guaranteed; one spouse’s approval to marry signals a trust so strong as to force the other spouse to hold beliefs which make divorce exceedingly emotionally unattractive. These results may have some bearing also on other partnerships than marriage.
Subjects: 
Marriage
time consistency
emotions
guilt
psychological game theory
JEL: 
C72
J12
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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