Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/82817
Authors: 
Budzinski, Oliver
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Department of Environmental and Business Economics, University of Southern Denmark 93
Abstract: 
Naturally, competition policy is based on competition economics made applicable in terms of law and its enforcement. Within the different branches of competition economics, modern industrial economics, or more precisely gametheoretic oligopoly theory, has become the dominating paradigm both in the U.S. (since the 1990s Post-Chicago movement) and in the EU (so-called more economic approach in the 2000s). This contribution reviews the state of the art in antitrust-oriented modern industrial economics and, in particular, critically discusses open questions and possible limits of basing antitrust on modern industrial economics. In doing so, it provides some hints how to escape current enforcement problems in industrial economics-based competition policy on both sides of the Atlantic. In particular, the paper advocates a change of the way modern industrial economics is used in competition policy: instead of more and more case-by-cases analyses, the insights from modern industrial economics should be used to design better competition rules.
Subjects: 
competition policy
antitrust
modern industrial economics
more economic approach
merger control
JEL: 
L40
K21
L00
M21
B52
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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