Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/82743 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2005:17
Verlag: 
Uppsala University, Department of Economics, Uppsala
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper derives a Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE) of a pay-as-bid auction, also called discriminatory auction. Such an auction is used in the balancing market for electric power in Britain. For some probability distributions of demand a pure-strategy equilibrium does not exist. If demand follows an inverse polynomial probability distribution, SFE always exists. Assuming this probability distribution, the pay-as-bid procurement auction is compared to a SFE of a uniform-price procurement auction, the auction form of most electric power markets. The demand-weighted average price is found to be equal or lower in the pay-as-bid procurement auction.
Schlagwörter: 
Supply function equilibrium
pay-as-bid auction
uniform-price auction
discriminatory auction
oligopoly
capacity constraint
wholesale electricity market
JEL: 
C62
D43
D44
L11
L13
L94
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
478.76 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.