Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/82705
Authors: 
Bergman, Mats A.
Jakobsson, Maria
Razo, Carlos
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Department of Economics, Uppsala University 2003:6
Abstract: 
Using a sample of 96 mergers notified to the EU Commission and logit regression techniques, we analyse the Commission's decision process. We find that the probability of a phase 2 investigation and of a prohibition of the merger increases with the parties' market shares. The probability increases also when the Commission finds high entry barriers or that post-merger collusion is easy. We do not find significant effects of political variables, such as the nationality of the merging firms or the identity of the commissioner.
Subjects: 
competition law
antitrust
merger
merger reulation
JEL: 
D78
K31
L40
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.