Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/82685
Authors: 
Hästö, Peter
Holmberg, Pär
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Department of Economics, Uppsala University 2005:23
Abstract: 
Most balaning markets of electric power are organized as uniform-price auctions. In 2001, the balancing market of England and Wales switched to a pay-as-bid auction with the intention of reducing wholesale electricity prices. Numerical simultations of an electricity auction model have indicated that this should lead to decreased average prices. In this article we prove two inequalities which give an analytic proof of this claim in the same model.
Subjects: 
supply function equilibrium
uniform-price auction
pay-as-bid auctions
discriminatory auction
oligopoly
capacity constraint
wholesale electricity markets
inequalities
JEL: 
C62
D43
D44
L11
L13
L94
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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