Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/82487
Authors: 
Bergman, Mats A.
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper Series 185
Abstract: 
Two-sided network effects in card payment systems are analysed under different market structures, e.g., competition, one-sided monopoly, bilateral monopoly and duopoly; with and without an interchange fee; for the so-called Baxter’s case of non-strategic merchants. A partial ranking of market structures according to their welfare effects is provided. Some support is found for the policy adopted by the EU Commission in the competition law case concerning Visa’s interchange fees.
Subjects: 
Two-sided markets
card payments
payment systems
acquiring
issuing
market structure
JEL: 
G21
L11
L44
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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