Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/82261
Authors: 
Persson, Malin
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation 2011:19
Abstract: 
This paper studies interrelations between two benefits in the Swedish social insurance system: the sickness insurance and the temporary parental benefit. The level of compensation differs between the two benefits creating an economic incentive for parents to claim temporary parental benefit when being ill. The substitution between the two benefits is studied using a randomized experiment were parents received information that their use of the temporary parental benefit would be subject to intensified monitoring. Receiving this information decreased utilization of the temporary parental benefit but at the same time led to an increase in short-term sickness absence by 4.9 percent. This corresponds to approximately 43 percent of the decreased use of the temporary parental benefit.
Subjects: 
Social insurance
social experiment
monitoring
moral hazard
JEL: 
J22
H55
H51
H30
I38
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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