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Autoren: 
Fredriksson, Peter
Holmlund, Bertil
Datum: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2003:5
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper provides a review of the recent literature on how incentives in unemployment insurance (UI) can be improved. We are particularly concerned with three instruments, viz. the duration of benefit payments (or more generally the time sequencing of benefits), monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and workfare. Our reading of the theoretical literature is that the case for imposing a penalty on less active job search is fairly solid. A growing number of empirical studies, including randomized experiments, are in line with this conclusion.
Schlagwörter: 
Unemployment insurance
search
monitoring
sanctions
workfare
JEL: 
J64
J65
J68
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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