Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/82149
Authors: 
Johansson, Per
Palme, Mårten
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation 2004:10
Abstract: 
We use a reform of Sweden’s sickness insurance system as a source of exogenous variation to analyse the presence of moral hazard. As a result of the reform, the replacement level was reduced from 90 percent of forgone earnings to 65 percent for the first three days; to 80 percent between day 4 and 90; and remained at 90 percent after 90 days. We find that the incidence of work absence decreased due to the decrease in compensation level and that effect on duration is in accordance with moral hazard in the sickness insurance. We estimate the elasticities of the incidence with respect to forgone earning to -1 for males and -0.70 for females.
Subjects: 
Worker absenteeism
Cox proportional hazard models
regression-discontinuity
JEL: 
C41
H53
J22
J28
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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