Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/82099 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
EPRU Working Paper Series No. 2013-03
Verlag: 
University of Copenhagen, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), Copenhagen
Zusammenfassung: 
Do political institutions limit rent-seeking by politicians? To address this question, we study the transformation of petroleum rents into hidden wealth using unique data on bank deposits in tax havens. We find that petroleum rents are associated with increases in hidden wealth, but only when political institutions are very weak. We also discern an interesting interaction with political risk: events such as elections and domestic conflict are preceded by increases in hidden wealth when political institutions are weak, which is consistent with a view of autocratic rulers as forward-looking rent-seekers whose behavior is constrained by political checks and balances.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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