Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Beetsma, Roel
Jensen, Henrik
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
EPRU Working Paper Series 1999-11
We show how a stability pact based on deficit sanctions eliminates the exacerbation of debt accumulation that may arise from monetary unification. Moreover, by making sanctions contingent upon the economic situation of countries, the stability pact provides for risk sharing. Differences in initial debt levels, however, reduce the scope for unanimous support for a pact. We introduce also endogenous „fiscal discipline“ whose unobservability leads to moral hazard in its provision. If countries are ex ante identical, it is nevertheless optimal to make sanctions at least to some extent contingent on countries’ economic situation. However, with cross-country differences in the costs of providing discipline, some countries may oppose such contingency.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
446.02 kB

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.