Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/81954
Authors: 
Perroni, Carlo
Scharf, Kimberley A.
Year of Publication: 
1997
Series/Report no.: 
EPRU Working Paper Series 1997-05
Abstract: 
This paper examines how capital tax competition affects jurisdiction formation. We describe a locational model of public goods provision, where jurisdictions are represented by coalitions of consumers with similar tastes, and where the levels of taxation and local public goods provision within jurisdictions are selected by majority voting. We show that in this setting interjurisdictional tax competition results in an enlargement of jurisdictional boundaries, and can raise welfare for all members of a jurisdiction even in the absence of intrajurisdictional transfers.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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