Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/81540
Authors: 
Geller, Chris R.
Mustard, Jamie
Shahwan, Ranya
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Economics Discussion Papers 2013-42
Abstract: 
Experiments evaluate the fit of human behaviour to the Shapley-Shubik power index (SSPI), a formula of voter power. Groups of six subjects with differing votes divide a fixed purse by majority rule in online chat rooms. Earnings proxy for measured power. Chat rooms and processes for selecting subjects reduce or eliminate extraneous forces. Logrolling remains as the primary political force. Subjects' initial proposals for division of the purse allow measurement of effects from focal points and transaction costs. Divisions of purses, net of those effects, closely fit the SSPI, averaging 1.033 of their SSPI values. The SSPI can serve as a control for power imbedded in voting blocs, permitting fuller analysis of other factors that affect political outcomes.
Subjects: 
social choice
public choice
elections
bargaining
coalitions
politico economic
voting power
conflict
election
collective action
majority rule
JEL: 
D71
D72
D74
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
459.75 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.