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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IFN Working Paper No. 937
Verlag: 
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
We demonstrate how suppliers can take strategic speculative positions in derivatives markets to soften competition in the spot market. In our game, suppliers first choose a portfolio of call options and then compete with supply functions. In equilibrium firms sell forward contracts and buy call options to commit to downward sloping supply functions. Although this strategy is risky, it reduces the elasticity of the residual demand of competitors, who increase their mark-ups in response. We show that this type of strategic speculation increases the level and volatility of commodity prices and decreases welfare.
Schlagwörter: 
Supply function equilibrium
Option contracts
Strategic commitment
Speculation
JEL: 
C73
D43
D44
G13
L13
L94
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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