Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/81362
Authors: 
Tangerås, Thomas
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
IFN Working Paper 751
Abstract: 
This is a game-theoretic analysis of the link between regime type and international conflict. The democratic electorate can credibly punish the leader for bad conflict outcomes, whereas the autocratic selectorate cannot. For the fear of being thrown out of office, democratic leaders are (i) more selective about the wars they initiate and (ii) on average win more of the wars they start. Foreign policy behaviour is found to display strategic complementarities. The likelihood of interstate war, therefore, is lowest in the democratic dyad (pair), highest in the autocratic dyad with the mixed dyad in between. The results are consistent with empirical findings.
Subjects: 
Democracy
Autocracy
War
Maximal Equilibrium
JEL: 
D72
D74
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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