Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/81297 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IFN Working Paper No. 713
Verlag: 
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
The goal of this paper is twofold: First, to develop an estimable model of legislative politics in the US Congress, second, to provide a greater understanding of the objectives behind the New Deal. In the theoretical model, the distribution of federal funds across regions of the country is the outcome of bargaining game in which the President acts as the agenda-setter and Congress bargains over the final shape of the spending bill. For any given preferences (of the President) and distribution of seats in Congress, the model delivers a unique predicted allocation. Combined with data on New Deal programs, this is used to estimate the objectives of the Roosevelt administration. The results indicate that economic concerns for relief and recovery, though not necessarily for fundamental reform and development, largely drove New Deal spending. Political concerns also mattered, but more on the margin.
Schlagwörter: 
Political Economy
LegislativeBargaining
New Deal
US Congress
Public Spending
JEL: 
C78
D72
H11
H50
N42
P48
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
347.39 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.