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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IFN Working Paper No. 692
Verlag: 
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
This note provides sufficient conditions for immediate agreement in an extensive form model of interdependent bilateral bargaining. The model is suggested by Björnerstedt and Stennek (2006) as a work horse for studying bilateral oligopoly. The key feature of this model is that the firms are represented by separate agents in all negotiations in which they are involved. There is immediate agreement in equilibrium, essentially if production is strictly convex or if the agents use Markov strategies.
Schlagwörter: 
Bilateral Oligopoly
Intermediate Goods
Bargaining
Market Network
Trade Link
JEL: 
C70
D20
D40
L10
L40
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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