Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/81287
Authors: 
Lindqvist, Tobias
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
IUI Working Paper 634
Abstract: 
Theoretically, cross ownership may mitigate mergers, i.e. market concentrations. Holding a share in a competing firm before the acquisition of another firm, outsider-toehold, is more profitable in some market constellations, due to the positive externality on the outsider (competing) firm when a merger occurs. The purposes of this paper are to empirically observe when US firms buy outsider-toeholds and through event-studies estimate the gains of buyers, outsider firms and competitors when firms holding outsider-toeholds merge.
Subjects: 
Acquisition
Antitrust
Insiders’ Dilemma
Mergers
Toeholds
JEL: 
G34
L12
L13
L41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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