Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/81254
Authors: 
Saez-Marti, Maria
Sjögren, Anna
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
IUI Working Paper 618
Abstract: 
We analyze the effect of deadlines on timing of effort when agents are occasionaly distracted. We show that agents precautiously work early when completion of the task is uncertain, but rather likely. Agents who are rarely distracted will always postpone effort since the risk of not completing is small. As a result, increasing the probability of being distracted may even increase the likelihood of meeting the deadline. We further show that introducing the possibility of having the deadline extended may improve the total probability of completing the task without reducing the probability of completing within the originally announced deadline.
Subjects: 
Deadlines
Timing of Effort
Optimal Incentives
JEL: 
D81
J22
M50
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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