Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/81253
Authors: 
Lindbeck, Assar
Nyberg, Sten
Weibull, Jörgen W.
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
IUI Working Paper 585
Abstract: 
The paper analyses the interaction between economic incentives and work norms in the context of social insurance. If the work norm is endogenous in the sense that it is weaker when the population share of beneficiaries is higher, then voters will choose less generous benefits than otherwise. We also discuss welfare-state dynamics when there is a time lag in the adjustment of the norm in response to changes in this population share, and show how a temporary shift in the unemployment rate may cause persistence in the number of beneficiaries.
Subjects: 
Welfare State
Social Norms
Social Insurance
JEL: 
D19
D64
H31
Z13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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