Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/81175 
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
IUI Working Paper No. 608
Publisher: 
The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI), Stockholm
Abstract: 
This paper studies privatization policy in an international oligopoly. The argument that equal treatment of foreign investors will be detrimental to domestic welfare by shifting profits from domestic to foreign firms is shown to be less relevant in privatization auctions than in greenfield FDI models, since these profit shifts are partly paid for by the foreign firms in the bidding competition. Effects of local equity requirements, trade and investment policies are also studied. It is, for instance, shown that small local equity requirements are likely to be beneficial but large ones are counterproductive, by preventing welfare-enhancing foreign acquisitions.
Subjects: 
Privatization
Acquisitions
National Treatment
Investment Policy
Trade Policy
JEL: 
F23
L13
L33
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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