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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IFN Working Paper No. 685
Verlag: 
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper questions whether competition can replace sector-specific regulation of mobile telecommunications. We show that the monopolistic outcome prevails independently of market concentration when access prices are determined in bilateral negotiations. A light-handed regulatory policy can induce effective competition. Call prices are close to the marginal cost if the networks are sufficiently close substitutes. Neither demand nor cost information is required. A unique and symmetric call price equilibrium exists under symmetric access prices, provided that call demand is sufficiently inelastic. Existence encompasses the case of many networks and high network substitutability.
Schlagwörter: 
Network Competition
Two-way Access
Access Price Competition
Entry
Regulation
Network Substitutability
JEL: 
L51
L96
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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