Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/81144 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IFN Working Paper No. 698
Verlag: 
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
A fundamental problem in all political systems is that the people in power may extract rents to the detriment of the general public. In a democracy, electoral competition and information provided by the media may keep such rent extraction at bay. We develop a simple model where rents are decreasing in the degree of political competition and voter information. In line with our theoretical predictions, we find that both increased political competition and increased local media coverage substantially reduce direct measures of legal political rents among local governments in a non-corrupt democracy (Sweden).
Schlagwörter: 
Accountability
Political Competition
Media
Political Rents
JEL: 
D72
H10
H70
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
345.61 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.