Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/81144
Authors: 
Svaleryd, Helena
Vlachos, Jonas
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
IFN Working Paper 698
Abstract: 
A fundamental problem in all political systems is that the people in power may extract rents to the detriment of the general public. In a democracy, electoral competition and information provided by the media may keep such rent extraction at bay. We develop a simple model where rents are decreasing in the degree of political competition and voter information. In line with our theoretical predictions, we find that both increased political competition and increased local media coverage substantially reduce direct measures of legal political rents among local governments in a non-corrupt democracy (Sweden).
Subjects: 
Accountability
Political Competition
Media
Political Rents
JEL: 
D72
H10
H70
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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