Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/81141
Authors: 
Kraus, Daniel
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Thünen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 132
Abstract: 
This chapter provides new evidence on borrowers' hidden information about their riskiness and its link to their impatience. To do so, I analyze consumer loans on the German platform Smava, which has a unique peer-to-peer lending process. Observationally identical but unobservably riskier borrowers offer investors a higher interest rate. This helps them to obtain their loan faster and with a higher probability. Very impatient borrowers who use Smava's instant loan service pay a higher interest rate and have a higher default risk than less impatient borrowers. These findings suggest that borrowers' impatience can be used to screen their riskiness.
Subjects: 
Asymmetric Information
Financial Intermediation
Consumer loans
Patience
JEL: 
G21
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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